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ABSTRACT		
The	 UK	 decision	 to	 leave	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 following	 a	 referendum	 in	 June	 2016	
fundamentally	alters	the	country’s	relationship	with	the	EU,	with	its	European	neighbours,	with	the	
rest	of	the	world	and	potentially	with	its	own	constituent	units.	It	is	clear	that	different	parts	of	the	
UK	will	be	impacted	differently	by	this	decision	and	by	the	unfolding	exit	terms	and	process.	In	this	
context,	 Northern	 Ireland	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 particularly	 vulnerable.	 This	 article	 examines	 the	
referendum	 campaign	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 by	 detailing	 input	 from	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	
administration,	 political	 parties,	 civil	 society	 and	 external	 figures.	 The	 article	 suggests	 that	 the	
overall	referendum	campaign	in	Northern	Ireland	was	hamstrung	by	the	opposing	positions	taken	by	
key	 political	 protagonists,	 particularly	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 Democratic	 Unionist	 Party	 (DUP).	 This	
produced	 a	 challenging	 context	 for	 the	 referendum	 debate	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 The	 post-
referendum	 period	 has	 also	 been	 marked	 by	 persistent	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	 how	 best	 to	
approach	specific	Northern	Ireland	issues	and	challenges.	A	continued	absence	of	clear	positions	and	
a	 lack	 of	 contingency	 planning	 underline	 a	 poor	 level	 of	 preparedness	 for	 future	 political	
developments.	
	
	
	
2016	 has	 brought	 a	 series	 of	 political	 shocks	 and	 surprises	 across	 the	Western	 democratic	world.	
Disaffected	 voters	 have	 delivered	 unexpected	 referendum	 and	 election	 results	 which	 profoundly	
challenge	 existing	 governance	 arrangements.	 The	UK’s	 decision	 to	 leave	 the	 European	Union	 (EU)	
following	 a	 referendum	 in	 June	2016	 fundamentally	 alters	 the	 country’s	 relationship	with	 the	 EU,	
with	 its	 European	neighbours,	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	 and	potentially	with	 its	 own	 constituent	
units.	The	 impact	of	 the	vote	 remains	difficult	 to	qualify	and	quantify,	but	 it	 is	clear	 that	different	
parts	 of	 the	UK	will	 be	 impacted	 differently	 by	 this	 decision	 and	 by	 the	 unfolding	 exit	 terms	 and	
process.	In	this	context,	Northern	Ireland	is	considered	to	be	particularly	vulnerable	(see	for	example	
ESRI	2015;	Morgenrath	2015;	and	Open	University	Business	School	and	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	
2015).		
The	EU	has	played	a	 subtle	 role	 in	 supporting	Northern	 Ireland	 since	 the	UK	acceded	 to	 the	 then	
European	 Community	 in	 1973.	 EU	 support	 for	 successive	 domestic	 peace	 efforts	 has	 been	
underscored	 by	 financial	 commitments	 and	 initiatives	 (see	 Hayward	 and	 Murphy	 2012	 for	 an	
overview).	In	turn,	support	for	the	EU	in	Northern	Ireland	has	typically	been	stronger	than	in	other	
parts	of	 the	UK.	This	proved	 to	be	 the	case	when,	 in	contrast	 to	 the	UK	as	a	whole,	 the	Northern	
Ireland	electorate	returned	a	vote	to	Remain	following	the	June	2016	referendum.		
This	article	examines	the	referendum	campaign	 in	Northern	 Ireland	and	focuses	on	the	words	and	
actions	(or	lack	thereof)	of	the	Northern	Ireland	administration,	political	parties	and	civil	society.	It	
references	input	from	UK	political	figures	and	it	examines	the	extent	to	which	the	Irish	government	
took	an	active	interest	in	the	referendum	question.	The	article	suggests	that	the	overall	referendum	
campaign	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 was	 hamstrung	 by	 the	 opposing	 positions	 taken	 by	 key	 political	
protagonists,	 particularly	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 Democratic	 Unionist	 Party	 (DUP).	 This	 produced	 a	
challenging	context	for	the	referendum	debate	in	Northern	Ireland.	The	post-referendum	period	has	
also	been	marked	by	persistent	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	how	best	 to	 approach	 specific	Northern	
Ireland	 issues	 and	 challenges.	 A	 continued	 absence	 of	 clear	 positions	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 contingency	
planning	 underline	 a	 poor	 level	 of	 preparedness	 for	 future	 political	 developments.	 Arguably,	 this	
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diminishes	the	extent	to	which	the	Northern	Ireland	interest	can	be	protected	as	the	EU	and	the	UK	
negotiate	their	future	relationship.		
	
THE	REFERENDUM	CONTEXT	IN	NORTHERN	IRELAND		
The	smallest	of	the	UK’s	devolved	regions,	Northern	Ireland	is	geographically	removed	from	the	rest	
of	the	UK	but	shares	a	 land	border	with	the	Republic	of	 Ireland.	Scarred	by	an	extended	period	of	
conflict	which,	in	its	most	intense	form,	endured	from	the	late	1960s	to	1994,	Northern	Ireland	was	
experiencing	profound	political	instability	during	the	early	years	of	UK	accession	to	the	EU.	Support	
for	UK	membership	of	the	EU	in	1973	was	muted	in	Northern	Ireland.	Only	one	political	party,	the	
nationalist	Social	Democratic	and	Labour	Party	(SDLP),	was	vocal	in	supporting	accession.	Unionists	
and	Republicans	were	 less	enthusiastic.	The	former	feared	a	potentially	negative	 impact	on	British	
national	sovereignty	and	the	latter	was	focused	on	the	drive	to	secure	all-Ireland	sovereignty.	A	lack	
of	domestic	support	for	the	EU	was	not	the	only	factor	limiting	Northern	Ireland’s	early	relationship	
with	the	Union.	Engagement	was	also	thwarted	by	the	region’s	own	 internal	political	 troubles	and	
the	operation	of	direct	 rule.	 The	 conflict	dominated	political	discourse	and	discussion	 in	Northern	
Ireland,	 to	 the	 point	 where	 other	 policy	 priorities	 were	 side-lined.	 And	 nor	 did	 the	 specific	
governance	arrangements	which	pertained	until	the	signing	of	the	1998	Belfast	Agreement	facilitate	
a	high	degree	of	 regional	autonomy.	The	operation	of	direct	 rule	effectively	allowed	the	Northern	
Ireland	 political	 class	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 conventional	 political	 and	 policy	 debates.	 The	
introduction	 of	 devolution	 in	 1999	 altered	Northern	 Ireland’s	 constitutional	 status	within	 the	UK.	
The	 region	was	 granted	 advanced	 decentralised	 powers	which	were	 to	 be	managed	 by	 a	 directly	
elected	cross-community	Assembly	and	Executive.	This	move	demanded	much	of	Northern	Ireland’s	
political	parties	and	personnel.	 It	 required	the	new	administration	to	engage	more	robustly	with	a	
‘normal’	 policy	 agenda	 and	 less	 with	 constitutional	 and	 security	 issues.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 in	
generations,	Northern	Ireland	politicians	began	to	grapple	with	a	range	of	pressing	socio-economic	
challenges	 across	 policy	 portfolios	 including	 health,	 education,	 welfare	 and	 the	 environment.	
Contrasting	 pro-	 and	 anti-EU	 party	 positions	 sometimes	 impacted	 on	 the	 outputs	 of	 the	 local	
administration	 but,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 Northern	 Ireland	 enjoyed	 a	 harmonious	 relationship	 with	
Europe.		
	
THE	REFERENDUM	CAMPAIGN	IN	NORTHERN	IRELAND		
Northern	Ireland’s	traditionally	positive	relationship	with	the	EU	produced	a	less	hostile	referendum	
campaign	than	was	evident	across	other	parts	of	the	UK.	The	region’s	geographic	separateness	from	
the	rest	of	the	UK	and	its	land	border	with	the	Republic	of	Ireland	have	created	a	different	context	
for	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 EU.	 In	 addition,	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 distinctive	 political	 features	mean	
that	debate	and	discussion	 takes	place	 in	an	altogether	different	political	 and	 social	environment.	
The	 region’s	 consociational	 devolution	 arrangement	 and	 a	 dual	 ethnic	 party	 system	 make	 for	 a	
distinctive	and	unusual	political	context.		
The	devolved	power-sharing	Northern	 Ireland	Executive	 is	composed	of	political	parties	 from	both	
sides	 of	 the	 political	 divide	 and	 a	 series	 of	 specific	 arrangements	 exists	 to	manage	 and	 legitimise	
decision	 making	 and	 the	 legislative	 process.	 This	 political	 system	 was	 explicitly	 designed	 to	
accommodate	and	to	protect	the	rights	and	 interests	of	the	two	communities	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	
The	 system	 is	 subject	 to	 some	 criticism,	 including	 the	 charge	 that	 opposing	 political	 parties	 may	
often	face	difficulties	 in	reaching	agreement	on	contentious	 issues.	This	scenario	was	apparent	for	
the	 2016	 EU	 referendum	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	 In	 contrast	 to	 other	 devolved	UK	 regions	 –	 such	 as	
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Scotland	and	Wales	–	 the	Northern	 Ireland	Executive	did	not	produce	a	position	paper	on	 the	EU	
referendum.	The	Northern	Ireland	Draft	Programme	for	Government	Framework	2016-2021	did	not	
include	consideration	of	a	possible	Brexit	and	its	 implications	for	Northern	Ireland.	A	lack	of	clarity	
and	 unity	 on	 this	 question	 extended	 to	 the	Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	where	 there	was	minimal	
discussion	of	 the	referendum.	Assembly	Committees,	 such	as	 the	Committee	of	 the	then	Office	of	
the	 First	Minister	 and	Deputy	 First	Minister	 (OFMDFM)	 did	 not	 include	 reference	 to	 the	 EU	 in	 its	
strategic	 priorities	 for	 2014/2015.	 ‘European	 issues’	 was	 an	 indicative	 committee	 priority	 for	
2015/2016,	 but	 in	 the	 immediate	 run-up	 to	 the	 referendum,	 the	 committee	 (since	 renamed	 the	
Committee	of	the	Executive	Office)	did	not	engage	to	any	extensive	degree	with	the	question	of	EU	
membership.	 Other	 sectoral	 committees	 did	 consider	 the	 referendum.	 The	 Enterprise	 Committee	
investigated	the	economic	implications	for	Northern	Ireland	of	a	Brexit.	The	Briefing	Note	(produced	
by	 the	Open	University)	estimated	 that	economic	output	 in	Northern	 Ireland	would	be	3	per	 cent	
lower	 in	 the	event	of	a	UK	departure	 from	the	EU	(Open	University	Business	School	and	Northern	
Ireland	Assembly	2015).1	
Northern	Ireland’s	regional	political	parties	and	unusual	party	system	meant	that	other	UK	political	
forces,	such	as	the	Conservative	Party,	the	Labour	Party	and	UKIP,	did	not	dominate	the	campaign	as	
they	did	elsewhere.	These	parties	have	only	a	small	presence	in	Northern	Ireland	and	so	constitute	
very	 minor	 players.	 In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 the	 EU	 has	 never	 stirred	 the	 same	 level	 or	 intensity	 of	
political	debate	as	in	other	parts	of	the	UK.	The	SDLP	has	long	been	the	most	strident	in	its	support	
for	 the	 EU	 and	 continued	 EU	membership.	 The	 party,	 and	 in	 particular	 its	 young	 leader,	 were	 a	
strong	and	vocal	advocate	for	Remain.	Sinn	Féin’s	support	for	the	EU	has	altered	over	time.	Opposed	
to	successive	EU	referendums	on	EU	treaties	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland,	the	party	opted	to	support	
the	Remain	side	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	The	party	position	was	 influenced	by	Sinn	Féin’s	belief	that	a	
UK	 exit	 from	 the	 EU	would	 damage	Northern	 Ireland’s	 relationship	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 island	 of	
Ireland.	Other	smaller	parties,	including	the	Alliance	Party	of	Northern	Ireland	(APNI)	and	the	Green	
Party	also	campaigned	for	the	UK	to	stay	 in	the	EU.	Of	the	two	unionist	parties,	the	smaller	Ulster	
Unionist	Party	(UUP)	chose	to	support	Remain.	This	decision	was	somewhat	at	odds	with	the	party’s	
traditionally	sceptical	stance	on	Europe	and	it	was	opposed	by	some	former	and	serving	UUP	figures.	
The	 largest	 unionist	 party,	 the	DUP,	 and	 the	much	 smaller	 Traditional	 Unionist	 Voice	 (TUV)	 party	
were	the	key	political	advocates	for	Leave	in	Northern	Ireland.	The	DUP	was	also	closely	allied	to	the	
official	Vote	Leave	campaign	(see	McCann	and	Hainsworth	2016).		
All	of	the	Northern	Ireland	political	parties,	bar	the	SDLP,	were	late	to	develop	and	articulate	their	
positions	on	the	referendum	question.	In	addition,	political	parties	were	distracted	by	the	Northern	
Ireland	Assembly	election	which	 took	place	 just	 a	 few	weeks	prior	 to	23	 June.	During	 this	period,	
parties	were	heavily	focused	on	election	campaigns	and	local	issues.	Electioneering	did	not	tend	to	
include	 any	 substantial	 consideration	 of	 the	 upcoming	 referendum.	 Political	 engagement	 with	
referendum	 issues	did	 get	more	pronounced	 in	 the	weeks	 immediately	before	 the	 vote,	but	even	
then,	the	overall	impression	is	of	a	campaign	which	lacked	energy,	depth	and	momentum.		
Similarly	 to	 the	 rest	of	 the	UK,	 the	voices	 for	Leave	and	Remain	were	 filtered	 through	 two	official	
campaign	 groups.	 Britain	 Stronger	 in	 Europe	 and	 Vote	 Leave	 established	 branches	 in	 Northern	
Ireland	and	both	groups	focused	largely	on	general	topics	relevant	to	the	broader	UK	debate,	with	
some	 limited	discussion	of	Northern	 Ireland	specific	 concerns.	Sectoral	bodies	and	 interest	groups	
were	 also	 active.	 The	 Confederation	 of	 British	 Industry	 (CBI)	 (NI)	 was	 among	 the	 more	 vocal	
contributors	to	the	debate.	Trade	unions	and	the	voluntary	and	community	sector	also	engaged.	The	
EU	Debate	NI	initiative	(launched	by	the	Centre	for	Democracy	and	Peace	Building	(CDPB))	aimed	to	
provide	a	forum	and	space	for	detached	and	objective	consideration	of	key	issues	(see	EU	Debate	NI	
2015).	 The	 local	 Northern	 Ireland	 media	 covered	 the	 referendum	 campaign,	 and	 that	 coverage	
became	more	 frequent	and	numerous	as	 the	 referendum	date	neared.	The	UK	national	press	also	
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has	substantial	penetration	in	Northern	Ireland.	The	majority	of	this	coverage	pushed	a	Vote	Leave	
perspective	(see	Levy,	Aslan	and	Bironzo	2016).	
Rather	unusually,	the	Irish	government	contributed	to	the	debate,	not	just	in	Northern	Ireland,	but	
more	 broadly	 across	 the	 UK.	 Much	 of	 the	 wider	 Irish	 political	 establishment	 harboured	 deep	
concerns	about	the	impact	of	a	possible	Brexit	on	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	The	issue	was	categorised	
as	a	strategic	threat	to	Ireland’s	national	interest	(see	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	2016).		
The	 major	 campaign	 issues	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 were	 somewhat	 different	 from	 those	 which	
animated	discussion	elsewhere.	Immigration	was	discussed	but	to	a	lesser	extent.	Those	opposed	to	
Brexit	 in	Northern	 Ireland	were	more	concerned	about	 the	political	 and	economic	 impact	of	a	UK	
exit	 from	 the	 EU	 on	 the	 border	 between	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland.	 The	
implications	 for	 free	movement,	 trade	 and	 the	 peace	 process	were	 key	 referendum	 themes	 (and	
these	 were	 issues	 which	 also	 exercised	 the	 Irish	 government).	 The	 question	 of	 EU	 funding,	
particularly	 future	access	 to	 structural	 funds,	 the	Peace	Programme	and	 the	Common	Agricultural	
Policy	 (CAP),	was	 also	much	discussed	during	 the	Northern	 Ireland	 campaign.	 The	DUP	 and	other	
Leavers	disputed	the	purported	negative	political	and	economic	impact	of	Brexit	and	First	Minister	
Arlene	Foster	objected	strongly	to	the	contention	that	Brexit	might	undermine	the	Northern	Ireland	
peace	process.	Cries	of	 ‘Project	Fear’	were	not	unusual.	The	Leave	campaign	was	aided	by	 leading	
pro-Brexit	figures	who	visited	Northern	Ireland	during	the	campaign,	most	notably	Nigel	Farage	and	
Boris	 Johnson.	Those	supportive	of	Remain	were	helped	by	contributions	 from	senior	UK	and	 Irish	
political	 figures,	 including	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 the	 Irish	 Taoiseach	 who	 also	 spent	 time	 in	
Northern	Ireland.		
A	low-key	campaign	was	more	spirited	during	the	final	days	before	the	vote	(perhaps	motivated	by	
poll	 figures	which	suggested	that	the	Remain	side	was	 losing	ground).	However,	on	the	whole,	the	
campaign	was	late	to	gain	traction	and	it	did	not	substantially	engage	the	political	establishment	or	
the	public.	The	claims	of	both	sides	were	not	informed	by	detailed	research	or	analysis	pertinent	to	
Northern	Ireland,	and	nor	were	they	forensically	interrogated	by	the	media.	The	politically	sensitive	
themes	which	the	referendum	discussion	touched	upon	 in	 terms	of	 the	UK’s	constitutional	 future,	
the	status	of	the	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	the	impact	of	the	
vote	on	 the	peace	process	may	 also	 explain	why	parties	 shied	 away	 from	detailed	discussion	 and	
debate.	
	
THE	REFERENDUM	OUTCOME	IN	NORTHERN	IRELAND	
The	pollsters	have	been	making	unreliable	predictions	of	late!	In	Northern	Ireland	however,	the	EU	
referendum	result	was	as	expected.	55.8	per	cent	supported	Remain,	a	 figure	which	 is	 lower	 than	
that	recorded	in	other	regions	which	voted	the	same	way,	namely	Scotland,	London	and	Gibraltar.	
Turnout	in	Northern	Ireland	was	down	too.	Almost	ten	percentage	points	lower	than	for	the	UK	as	a	
whole,	and	8	per	cent	less	than	the	turnout	figure	for	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	election	a	few	
weeks	earlier.	Turnout	was	also	slightly	down	in	nationalist	constituencies.	The	Sinn	Féin	stronghold	
of	West	Belfast	where	fewer	than	50	per	cent	of	voters	cast	a	vote	is	particularly	notable.	Murphy	
(2016)	 has	 suggested	 that:	 ‘some	 nationalist	 voters	 may	 have	 strategically	 absented	 themselves	
from	the	voting	booths	in	an	attempt	to	contribute	to	a	Leave	vote	–	a	result	which	would	provide	a	
basis	for	calls	for	a	border	poll	(or	referendum	on	a	united	Ireland)’.	Sinn	Féin’s	call	for	a	border	poll	
in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	vote	was	roundly	rejected	by	all	other	political	parties	and	by	the	
UK	and	Irish	governments.	The	suggestion	that	the	Northern	Ireland	vote	to	Remain	is	synonymous	
with	support	for	a	united	Ireland	is	not	plausible	given	that	almost	two-fifths	of	Unionists	supported	
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the	 Remain	 side.	 The	 notion	 that	 their	 constitutional	 preference	 for	 unity	 with	 the	 UK	 has	 now	
diminished	or	disappeared	is	imprudent.		
The	Northern	Ireland	result,	however,	does	reveal	a	clear	East-West	divide	in	Northern	Ireland.	11	of	
the	 18	 constituencies	 there	 voted	 Remain,	 including	 the	 Belfast	 constituencies	 and	 all	 border	
constituencies.	A	Leave	result	was	recorded	in	all	Eastern	constituencies,	whilst	those	constituencies	
represented	 by	 a	 nationalist	 or	 independent	 MP	 returned	 a	 vote	 in	 favour	 of	 continued	 EU	
membership.	In	fact,	the	Foyle	constituency	recorded	the	fourth	highest	Remain	vote	(78.3	per	cent)	
of	 all	 UK	 constituencies.	 Three	 constituencies	 with	 Unionist	 representation	 in	 Westminster	 also	
supported	Remain.	The	seven	constituencies	which	voted	Leave	were	all	Unionist	in	orientation.		
This	 referendum	outcome	 is	 interesting	because	 it	 does	not	 demonstrate	 the	 existence	of	 a	 stark	
communal	divide.	A	simplistic	nationalist/unionist	explanation	 for	 the	Northern	 Ireland	vote	 is	not	
convincing	(Mills	and	Colvin	2016).	This	is	also	confirmed	by	an	Ipsos-Mori	poll	which	found	that	40	
per	cent	of	Protestant	voters	 in	Northern	Ireland	wanted	the	UK	to	stay	in	the	EU	(McBride	2016).	
Related	 research	 by	Garry	 (2016:	 2)	 notes	 that:	 ‘two	 thirds	 of	 self-described	 “unionists”	 voted	 to	
leave	while	almost	90	per	cent	of	self-described	“nationalists”	voted	to	remain’.	Unionists	were	less	
influenced	 by	 their	 party’s	 position	 than	 nationalists	 were.	 A	 larger	 proportion	 of	 Unionists	 than	
nationalists	 defied	 their	 party	 position	 when	 voting	 in	 this	 referendum	 –	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 DUP	
supporters	voted	to	Remain,	while	58	per	cent	of	UUP	voters	opted	to	Leave	(Garry	2016:	6).		
In	line	with	other	trends	across	the	UK,	educational	qualification	is	linked	to	vote	choice	in	Northern	
Ireland.	The	more	educated	were	more	likely	to	support	Remain.	80	per	cent	of	professionals	chose	
for	 the	 UK	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 EU	 while	 fewer	 than	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 manual	 workers	 did.	 Attitudes	 to	
immigration	were	also	predictors	of	vote	choice	with	those	opposed	to	 immigration	more	 likely	to	
vote	Leave.	Northern	 Ireland	attitudes	mirror	 some	of	 the	deeper	 socio-economic	concerns	which	
motivated	voters	across	the	UK	as	a	whole:	
In	short	there	does	seem	to	be	evidence	supporting	the	idea	that	there	is	a	cluster	of	
traits	 (low	 education	 and	 skill)	 and	 beliefs	 (anti	 immigrant,	 socially	 conservative,	
alienated	 from	 politics)	 associated	with	 the	 leave	 vote	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 that	 is	
consistent	with	the	‘left	behind	by	liberal	globalisation’	argument	elaborated	in	the	
rest	of	the	UK	(Garry	2016:	6).	
 
THE	REFERENDUM	AFTERMATH	IN	NORTHERN	IRELAND	
Questions	 about	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Irish	 border	 after	 Brexit	 have	dominated	discourse	 in	Northern	
Ireland	since	 the	 referendum	result.	Membership	of	 the	EU	single	market	has	effectively	 removed	
the	 border	 between	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland,	 and	 this	 has	 altered	 not	 just	
economic	relations	on	the	 island	but	political	 relations	too.	 In	2014,	cross-border	trade	was	worth	
over	 300	 million	 EUR	 (InterTradeIreland	 2016a).	 Since	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 Northern	
Ireland	 companies	 and	57	per	 cent	of	 Irish	 companies	 think	Brexit	will	 have	a	negative	 impact	on	
cross-border	sales.	A	majority	of	Northern	Ireland	firms	(62	per	cent)	are	keen	to	continue	to	have	
access	to	the	single	market	and	free	movement	of	people	(InterTradeIreland	2016b).	In	terms	of	free	
movement,	 the	 status	of	 the	Common	Travel	Area	 (CTA)	between	 Ireland	and	 the	UK	 is	 now	also	
under	 scrutiny.	How,	 indeed	 if,	 the	benefits	of	 this	 arrangement	 can	be	protected	post-Brexit	 has	
been	one	of	the	key	concerns	for	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Irish	government	too.		
The	hard	or	soft	character	of	the	border	post-Brexit	is,	therefore,	of	substantial	significance	to	both	
Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	Republic	 of	 Ireland.	 The	 Prime	Minister’s	 intimation	 that	 she	 intends	 to	
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prioritise	border	controls	over	single	market	access	however,	suggests	that	she	favours	a	hard	Brexit.	
This	would	 likely	require	the	re-imposition	of	a	more	visible	border	between	Northern	 Ireland	and	
the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland	 including	 border	 controls	 and	 fortification.	 The	 political	 and	 psychological	
impact	of	such	a	move	threatens	to	undermine	the	ongoing	(and	still	fragile)	Northern	Ireland	peace	
process.	Former	Northern	Ireland	Secretary	of	State,	Lord	Mandelson,	has	noted	(Belfast	Newsletter	
15	March	2016):		
…	 the	 reimposition	 of	 a	 formalised	 border	would	 be	 a	 radical	 departure	 from	 the	
established	strategy	of	the	administrations	 in	Dublin,	London	and	Belfast.	Anything	
in	 my	 view	 that	 strengthened	 a	 sense	 of	 separatism	 between	 Northern	 and	
Southern	 Ireland	 –	 physically,	 economically,	 psychologically	 –	 has	 the	 potential	 to	
upset	the	progress	that	has	been	made	and	serve	as	a	potential	source	of	renewed	
sectarianism	that	would	always	bear	the	risk	of	triggering	further	violence	in	Ireland,	
particularly	in	the	North.	
Whether	 a	 hard	 or	 soft	 border	 materialises	 has	 potentially	 profound	 political	 and	 economic	
implications	for	the	region,	and	for	the	 island	of	 Ireland	as	a	whole.	There	are	various	 ideas	about	
how	new	border	arrangements	might	be	structured	and	managed,	and	in	particular	how	disruption	
to	trade	and	free	movement	might	be	avoided.	The	Irish	government’s	Contingency	Framework	for	
Brexit	(see	its	Appendix)	notes:		
While	ultimately	dependent	on	 the	outcome	of	EU-UK	 trade	negotiations,	 analysis	
will	be	deepened	on	options	for	possible	customs	and	excise	controls,	including	the	
role	of	modern	technology,	with	a	view	to	minimising	impediments	to	trade.		
There	are	ideas	too	about	where	the	border	might	be.	Moving	border	controls	away	from	the	border	
between	North	and	South,	and	shifting	them	to	the	sea	border	between	Northern	 Ireland	and	the	
UK	 has	 been	mooted	 as	 a	means	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 soft	 border	 to	 exist	 on	 the	 island	 of	 Ireland.	 The	
political	ramifications	of	such	a	move,	however,	and	perhaps	more	especially	its	symbolic	effect,	can	
be	construed	as	creating	a	de	 facto	united	 Ireland,	a	proposition	which	 is	vehemently	opposed	by	
Unionists.		
The	Northern	 Ireland	 Executive’s	 response	 to	 the	 referendum	outcome	has	been	minimal.	A	 joint	
letter	to	the	Prime	Minister	from	the	First	Minister	and	Deputy	First	Minister	outlines	key	concerns	
for	 Northern	 Ireland	 during	 this	 new	 era.	 It	 emphasises	 concerns	 about	 the	 border,	 and	 it	 also	
references	other	areas	 including	trade,	energy,	EU	funding	and	the	agri-food	and	fisheries	 industry	
where	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	wishes	to	be	involved	and	engaged	in	protecting	key	interests.	
Beyond	 this	 limited	 show	 of	 cross-party	 unity	 however,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 contingency	 plan	 in	
Northern	Ireland.	McGowan	(2016)	notes	how	problematic	this	is:	
many	of	Northern	Ireland’s	core	priorities	–	such	as	agriculture	and	fishing	–	may	be	
less	 important	 issues	 for	 the	 UK	 negotiating	 position	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 Executive	
needs	to	advance	its	priorities	and	it	will	be	imperative	for	it	to	develop	meaningful	
dialogue	with	David	Davis’	Department	for	Exiting	the	European	Union.		
The	inability	of	the	Executive	to	agree	a	joint	position	is	echoed	in	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly.	A	
recent	motion	endorsing	a	proposal	 that	 there	should	be	 legal	 recognition	of	 the	unique	status	of	
Northern	 Ireland	and	the	circumstances	on	the	 island	as	part	of	the	arrangements	to	 leave	the	EU	
was	defeated	by	a	single	vote	on	17	October	2016.	The	 fractious	debate	which	preceded	the	vote	
further	underlines	the	absence	of	an	agreed	strategy	in	Northern	Ireland	and	highlights	the	division	
between	nationalists	and	unionists	about	how	to	deal	with	 the	 implications	of	Brexit	 for	Northern	
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Ireland	 (see	 Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	 2016).	 This	 additional	 lack	 of	 political	 cohesion	 and	 unity	
limits	the	strength	of	Northern	Ireland’s	position	during	the	various	negotiations	to	come.	
There	 are	 other	 avenues	 too,	 including	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	 committees	 and	 the	
institutions	 created	 by	 the	 1998	 Belfast	 Agreement,	 namely	 the	 North-South	 Ministerial	 Council	
(NSMC)	and	the	British-Irish	Council	(BIC).	The	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	committees	have	not	been	
vociferous	 in	 their	 examination	 of	 the	 referendum	 vote.	 There	 has	 been	 only	 limited	 committee	
discussion	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 result,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 plans	 to	 convene	 an	 inquiry	 or	
consultation.	This	contrasts	with	the	work	of	other	parliaments,	 in	London	and	Dublin,	which	have	
engaged	in	deeper	examination	of	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	relations	with	Ireland.		
There	 has	 been	 some	 tentative	 engagement	 with	 other	 institutions.	 The	 BIC,	 in	 particular,	 may	
become	 an	 interesting	 forum	 for	 the	 UK’s	 regions	 and	 nations	 to	 communicate	 their	 views.	 An	
extraordinary	meeting	of	the	Council	took	place	in	Cardiff	on	22	July	2016	to	discuss	the	implications	
of	 Brexit.	 A	 new	 Joint	 Ministerial	 Committee	 on	 EU	 Negotiations	 (JMC(EN))	 will	 be	 the	 primary	
vehicle	 for	 agreeing	 a	 UK	 approach	 to	 the	 Article	 50	 negotiations	 and	 for	 accommodating	 the	
interests	of	all	constituent	units	of	the	UK.	Irish	government	attempts	to	harness	an	all-island	cross-
party	and	cross-sectoral	approach	to	Brexit	have	been	thwarted	by	Unionist	non-participation	in	the	
All-Island	 Civic	 Dialogue	 on	 Brexit	 which	 convened	 in	 Dublin	 on	 2	 November	 2016.	 The	 initiative,	
however,	 does	 include	 some	Northern	 Ireland	 civil	 society	 representation	 and	 it	 envisages	 future	
meetings	and	dialogue.		
	
CONCLUSION	
The	June	2016	referendum	rejection	of	UK	membership	of	the	EU	has	thrown	up	a	whole	series	of	
pronounced	challenges	 for	 the	Union,	 for	 the	UK,	 its	neighbours	and	 its	 constituent	units.	 The	UK	
wide	referendum	has	been	criticised	for	the	way	in	which	it	allowed	unchecked	commentary	on	the	
EU	 (by	 both	 Leavers	 and	 Remainers)	 to	 inform	 the	 narrative.	 The	 quality	 of	 the	 debate	 and	 the	
discussion	 suffered	 (see	 Liddle	 2016).	 In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 the	 bigger	 issue	was	 not	 so	much	 the	
quality	 of	 the	 debate,	 rather	 the	 limited	 and	 late	 amount	 of	 debate.	 The	 Northern	 Ireland	
administration,	political	parties	and	civil	society	were	slower	to	engage	with	key	referendum	issues.	
The	 quality	 of	 debate	was	 also	 restricted	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 information,	 data	 and	 expertise	 specifically	
relevant	to	Northern	Ireland.		
The	 referendum	 result	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 produced	 majority	 support	 for	 Remain	 and	 revealed	
some	 cross-party	 and	 cross-community	 support	 for	 this	 outcome.	 It	 also	 produced	 a	 result	which	
conflicts	with	that	of	the	UK	as	a	whole	and	begs	questions	about	how	to	accommodate	Northern	
Ireland’s	 preference.	 The	 possibility	 of	 a	 ‘special	 arrangement’	 for	 Northern	 Ireland	 has	 been	
mooted,	but	 there	 is	 little	 clarity	about	 the	detail	 of	 such	a	 scenario.	 The	 seeming	 inability	of	 the	
parties	to	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	and	Assembly	to	agree	and	to	implement	a	framework	for	
dealing	with	Brexit	diminishes	the	strength	of	Northern	Ireland	input	to	the	wider	process	of	the	UK	
extracting	 itself	 from	 the	 EU.	 In	 the	 past,	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 failure	 to	 agree	 and	 communicate	 a	
position	on	various	EU	policies	has	been	damaging	(see	Murphy	2014).	On	this	occasion,	however,	
the	stakes	are	arguably	very	much	higher.		
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ENDNOTES	
1	 The	 Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	 Research	 and	 Information	 Service	 briefing	 paper,	 The	 EU	 Referendum	 and	 Northern	
Ireland:	Information	Resources	(20	May	2016)	provides	a	clear	illustration	of	the	lack	of	consideration	of	the	referendum	
issue	by	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	relative	to	Westminster,	the	Irish	Parliament	and	other	UK	devolved	legislatures.		
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